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In Yong Vui Kong v Public Prosecutor, the Singapore Court of Appeal recently 
reaffi rmed the constitutionality of the mandatory death penalty for drug traf-
fi cking offences under the Misuse of Drugs Act. Specifi cally, the Singapore 
Court held that the judicial obligation to impose a capital sentence, once guilt 
for the drug offence was so established, was neither a violation of the accused’s 
constitutional right against the deprivation of his life in accordance with law nor 
a denial of his right to equal protection under the law. In this article, the author 
argues that, whilst one may be sympathetic to their Lordships for reaching the 
result they did, in light of the political realities underpinning Singapore’s consti-
tutional arrangement, the legal arguments advanced by the Court of Appeal for 
their decision unfortunately do not withstand close scrutiny. 
Introduction 
Recently, in Yong Vui Kong v Public Prosecutor,1 the Singapore Court of 
Appeal, the nation state’s court of fi nal resort, reaffi rmed the constitu-
tionality of the mandatory death penalty for drug-traffi cking offences 
under the Misuse of Drugs Act. Specifi cally, the Singapore Court held 
that the judicial obligation to impose a capital sentence once guilt for the 
drug offence was so established was neither a violation of the accused’s 
constitutional right against the deprivation of his life in accordance with 
law [Article 9(1)2 of the Singapore Constitution] nor a denial of his right 
to equal protection under the law [Article 12(1)3 of the Singapore Con-
stitution]. In this article, the author argues that, whilst one may be sym-
pathetic to their Lordships for reaching the result they did, in light of the 
political realities underpinning Singapore’s constitutional arrangement, 
the legal arguments the Court of Appeal advanced for their decision 
unfortunately do not withstand close scrutiny. 
* Assistant Professor, University of Hong Kong.
1 [2010] SGCA 20. 
2 Art 9(1) of the Singapore Constitution reads: No person shall be deprived of his life or personal 
liberty save in accordance with law.
3 Art 12(1) of the Singapore Constitution reads: All persons are equal before the law and entitled 
to equal protection of the law. 
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The appellant, Yong Vui Kong, was convicted of traffi cking 47.27g 
of diamorphine, a controlled drug, by the High Court of Singapore and 
was accordingly sentenced to death under the Misuse of Drugs Act. On 
appeal, the appellant argued against only his sentence, ie the manda-
tory nature of the death penalty (hereinafter MDP) as prescribed by the 
impugned statute infringed upon Article 9(1) and Article 12(1) of the 
Singapore Constitution. 
The appellant’s constitutional challenges rested on three main 
grounds: 1) the MDP legislation was not “law” for the purposes of 
Article 9(1), as the expression “law” excluded inhuman forms of punish-
ment and, accordingly, the appellant could not be deprived of his life in 
this manner; 2) customary international law precluded the imposition 
of the MDP and since customary international law was part of the laws 
of Singapore, this practice was prohibited by Article 9(1); and 3) the 
imposition of the MDP on offenders who traffi cked more than 15g of 
diamorphine caused arbitral distinctions to be drawn between offenders 
who traffi cked in different amounts of controlled drugs and thus violated 
the constitutional right to equal protection under Article 12(1). 
Article 9(1) and Inhuman Punishment 
Responding fi rst to what the court termed the “inhuman punishment” 
limb of the Article 9(1) challenge, the Chief Justice, on behalf of the 
Court, reaffi rmed the correctness of past Singapore precedents that had 
upheld the constitutionality of the MDP for drug offences. In particular, 
back in 1981, whilst the Privy Council of Singapore in Ong Ah Chuan v 
Public Prosecutor had acknowledged that “law” for the purposes of 
Article 9(1) also referred to “a system of law which incorporates those 
fundamental rules of natural justice that had formed part and parcel of 
the common law of England that was in operation in Singapore at the 
commencement of the Constitution”,4 the Board nonetheless held that 
the MDP legislation did not breach any fundamental rules of natural jus-
tice. More recently, the Singapore Court of Appeal in Nguyen Tuong Van 
v Public Prosecutor5 took the view that “the mandatory death sentence 
prescribed under the MDA is suffi ciently discriminating to obviate any 
inhumanity in its operation”6 and was therefore constitutional. 
4 Ong Ah Chuan v Public Prosecutor [1981] AC 648 at 670–671.
5 [2005] 1 SLR 103. 
6 Ibid. at para 87. 
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Instead of merely reiterating the views advanced in the prior case law, 
this new panel of Court of Appeal judges also harnessed new arguments 
previously unexamined by its predecessors in support of its conclusion 
that Article 9(1) did not prohibit the state imposition of inhuman pun-
ishment. Confronted with a litany of Privy Council cases from the Carib-
bean States7 where the Law Lords in the United Kingdom, post-Ong Ah 
Chuan, had overturned the MDP imposed by the respective state legisla-
tions, the Court of Appeal fl atly rejected their applicability on the basis 
that these overseas decisions involved constitutions which expressly pro-
hibited inhuman punishments, whilst “the Singapore Constitution does 
not contain any express prohibition against inhuman punishment”8 and 
“it would not be appropriate for (judges) to legislate new rights into the 
Singapore Constitution under the guise of interpreting existing consti-
tutional provisions”9 when such an exercise would be against the origi-
nal intent of the constitutional framers. According to the Chief Justice, 
Singapore’s Fundamental Liberties Clauses as enshrined in Part IV of 
Singapore Constitution was based on its equivalent in the 1963 Malaysian 
Federal Constitution,10 which was likewise based on the 1957 Malayan 
Constitution drafted pursuant to the advice of the Federation of Malayan 
Constitutional Commission chaired by Lord Reid (Reid Commission). 
In the Chief Justice’s opinion, the fact that the Reid Commission did not 
recommend in favour of an express prohibition against inhuman punish-
ment, even though such a provision existed in the European Convention 
of Human Rights – an instrument that applied in all the British colo-
nies (including Singapore and Malaysia) prior to independence, clearly 
illustrated that this omission was deliberate and not due to ignorance or 
oversight.11 Herein, the Court of Appeal appeared to espouse an origi-
nalist understanding of the Singapore Constitution and would, in turn, 
only invalidate “legislation of so absurd or arbitrary a nature that it could 
not possibly have been contemplated by our (Singapore’s) constitutional 
framers as being ‘law’ when they crafted the constitutional provisions 
protecting fundamental liberties.”12 
Specifi cally, originalist judges, such as Justice Antonin Scalia on the 
United States Supreme Court, have argued that, in interpreting the 
7 See Reyes v The Queen [2002] 2 AC 235, Fox v Queen [2002] 2 AC 284, R v Hughes, (2002) 
1 AC 259.
8 See n 1 above at para 60. 
9 See n 1 above at para 59. 
10 Singapore became a constituent state of Malaysia in 1963 and gained full independence as a 
sovereign republic in 1965. 
11 See n 1 above at para 62. 
12 See n 1 above at para 16. 
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Constitution, judges should “look for a sort of objectifi ed intent – the 
intent that a reasonable person would gather from the text of the law, 
placed alongside the remainder of the corpus juris.”13 In deriving this 
objective intent, Scalia would look to historical understandings and prac-
tices that were accepted at the time the constitutional provisions were 
adopted. Thus, contemporary practices, especially foreign ones, would be 
irrelevant during constitutional adjudication. Originalists often caution 
that, if judges are allowed to stray from the original understanding of the 
Constitution, they will be given free rein to amend the Constitution and, 
in the process, judges, who are non-elected offi cials, would be imposing 
norms that the people have not accepted through their democratically-
elected representatives.14  
This judicial appeal to originalism as a theory of constitutional adju-
dication in Singapore nevertheless is not unproblematic. First, unlike the 
United States Constitution or many national Constitutions, the con-
stitutional texts of Singapore’s Fundamental Liberties Clauses were not 
deliberated upon by the Constituent Assembly of the independent state 
in question. In fact, no constituent assembly was in fact convened when 
Singapore gained independence in 1965 from Malaysia. Instead, seces-
sion from Malaysia was so sudden that, as a matter of expedience, Singa-
pore simply made several Fundamental Liberties provisions found in the 
Malaysia Federal Constitution applicable in Singapore via the Republic 
of Singapore Independence Act.15 Certainly, the fact that the legislature 
of a newly-sovereign republic consciously adopted those provisions con-
ferred upon these Singaporean liberties a legal life of their own. But the 
mere enactment of the law alone does not provide us with a clue as to 
the original meaning attached by the Framers to those provisions they 
adopted. Given the fact the Singapore did not deliberate upon the text 
and phraseology of its Fundamental Liberties Clauses, but merely imported 
them as a matter of expedience from Malaysia, one does wonder whether 
it is even possible to discern the original meaning the Singapore Framers 
attached to those provisions adopted from Malaysia. At best, one can try 
to discern the original intent of the Framers when Malaysia’s Constitu-
tion was adopted, but it would be very odd for judges in today’s Singapore 
to give effect to and be fettered by the original intent of another nation 
13 Antonin Scalia, “Common Law Courts in a Civil Law System: The Role of the United States 
Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws”, in A Matter of Interpretation at 17 
(Amy Gutmann (ed), 1998).
14 Antonin Scalia, Commentary, (1996) 40 St Louis ULJ 1119. 
15 See Kevin Y.L. Tan, “State and institution Building through the Singapore Constitution 1965– 
2005” 49 at 54 in Thio and Tan, Evolution of a Revolution: Forty Years of the Singapore Constitu-
tion (Routledge, 2010). 
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state’s constitutional framers. The Chief Justice, possibly aware of the 
weakness in this line of reasoning, went on to shore up his argument by 
referencing the work of the Singapore Constitutional Commission tasked 
in 1966 to recommend specifi c constitutional amendments for the Gov-
ernment’s consideration post-independence. In particular, the learned 
Chief Justice highlighted the fact that, notwithstanding the Constitu-
tional Commission’s recommendation for the inclusion of a proposed 
Article 13(1) that would have expressly prohibited torture and inhuman 
punishment, the Singapore Government unambiguously rejected this 
proposal in 1969. Therefore, according to the Court of Appeal, it was 
“not legitimate for this court to read into Art 9(1) a constitutional right 
which was decisively rejected by the Government in 1969, especially 
given the historical context in which that right was rejected.”16 Yet, one 
must remember that the Fundamental Liberties Clauses of the Singapore 
Constitution came into effect in 1965, soon after Singapore’s indepen-
dence. Hence, it is debatable, even on an originalist understanding of the 
Singapore Constitution, whether it was legitimate for the Court to dis-
cern the original intent of the constitutional framers in 1965, when they 
imported the applicable Fundamental Liberties Clauses from Malaysia, 
from a Parliamentary decision taken four years later. 
Even if we assume that the intent of the constitutional framers in 
1969 to reject a constitutional prohibition against torture and inhuman 
punishment did mirror a similar intent amongst the framers in 1965, 
to be consistent, this would mean that whatever recommendations the 
Constitutional Commission made in 1966, but were not taken up sub-
sequently by the Government in 1969, should also not be judicially 
deemed a constitutional right. Taking this argument to its logical con-
clusion, the right to vote will also not be a constitutionally-protected 
fundamental liberty, as it is not expressly enshrined in the Singapore 
Constitution and the Constitutional Commission in the 1960s had 
equally failed to convince the Government to entrench this right in the 
same manner as other enshrined rights.17 After all, if one takes the view 
that there can be no implied right against inhuman punishment under 
16 See n 1 above at para 72. 
17 Interestingly, the Chief Justice, when he was Attorney General, opined in an advice to the Gov-
ernment that the right to vote is “implied within the structure of our (Singapore’s) Constitution” 
since Art 39 requires Parliament to be composed of elected Members of Parliament to be returned 
at a general election. See Singapore Parliamentary Reports, 16 May 2001, col 1726. Yet, one must 
note that on a literal (and lethal) reading of the Singapore Constitution, Parliament can still pass 
laws restricting the right of suffrage in general elections to only a selected segment of society and 
still be in technical compliance with the constitutional requirements of Art 39. One must also 
note that although Art 65 of the Singapore Constitution states that the lifespan of the Singapore 
Parliament is fi ve years, it does not in any way guarantee who may vote in such elections. 
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Article 9(1) because the Singapore Government refused to entrench 
this right expressly in 1969, surely, to be consistent, the Courts cannot 
also read in any implied right to vote because the Singapore Govern-
ment equally refused to entrench an express right to vote then. If so, 
Parliament may now pass legislation in Singapore to allow only elite 
segments of society to vote in general elections or abolish confi dential 
voting at general elections. It is thus evidently clear that the conse-
quences of this line of reasoning, if observed by future Singapore Courts, 
would be very grave. 
However, fortunately for Singapore, the Court of Appeal soon proved 
unwilling to take its own argument to its logical conclusion. As observed 
by the Chief Justice, “This conclusion does not mean that, because 
the proposed Art 13 included a prohibition against torture, an Act of 
Parliament that permits torture can form part of ‘law’ for the purposes of 
Art 9(1).”18 It appears herein that the Chief Justice was suggesting that 
there existed an implied prohibition against torture under Article 9(1). 
Whilst one should certainly applaud this judicial concession, this pro-
nouncement is very puzzling. As a matter of logic, if the Chief Justice 
were reluctant to expand, via an interpretive exercise, the scope of 
Article 9(1) so as to include a constitutional prohibition against inhu-
man punishment because Parliament had deliberately refused to enact 
such a provision, surely this reasoning must also bar any elevation of a 
prohibition against torture to a constitutional right since this proposal, 
too, was deliberately rejected by the Government in 1969. The Court 
of Appeal interestingly justifi ed this distinction on the basis that the 
Singapore Minister of Home Affairs in 1987 had explicitly recognised 
that torture was wrong19 and that torture, in so far as it caused harm to 
another’s body with criminal intent, was already criminalised under the 
Singapore Penal Code.20 With respect, the logic of this argument eludes 
this author. One does wonder how a mere statement from the Home 
Minister during Parliamentary Debates in 1987 would license the Court, 
on an originalist understanding of the Singapore Constitution, to elevate 
a prohibition against torture into a constitutional right and the fact that 
bodily assault is a crime in Singapore would surely not have any bearing 
on this matter. Perhaps, the Chief Justice, like Justice Scalia, is a “faint-
hearted originalist”21 and Singapore’s constitutional jurisprudence will 
18 See n 1 above at para 75. 
19 Singapore Parliamentary Debates, Offi cial Report (29 July 1987) Vol 49 at cols 1491–1492. 
20 See n 1 above at para 75. 
21 Scalia, “Originalism: The Lesser Evil”, 57 UCinLRev 849 at 864.
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be better for it. Unfortunately, the Court of Appeal, whilst recognising 
that Article 9(1) prohibited torture, went on to state unequivocally that 
“currently, no domestic legislation permits torture”, thereby insulating 
all current offi cial state practices from a challenge on this ground, and 
in particular judicial caning, a common-place punishment for vandalism 
and rape in Singapore. 
Interestingly, in addition to recognising an implicit constitutional 
right against torture, the Court of Appeal also opined that Article 9(1) 
would equally invalidate:
“colourable legislation which purported to enact a ‘law’ as generally under-
stood (i.e., a legislative rule of general application), but which in effect was 
a legislative judgment, that is to say, legislation directed at securing the 
conviction of particular known individuals (see Don John Francis Douglas 
Liyanage and others v The Queen [1967] 1 AC 259 at 291.”
This is a laudable but very curious pronouncement, especially since the 
Chief Justice held that this would perhaps be what “the Privy Council 
(in Ong Ah Chuan) had in mind vis-à-vis the kind of legislation that 
would not qualify as ‘law’ for the purposes of Art 9(1).”22 But one does 
wonder on what evidence the Chief Justice based this inference, for his 
Lordship did not provide any. After all, Liyanage was not discussed by the 
Privy Council in Ong Ah Chuan and it was decided about 15 years before 
Ong Ah Chuan by the Privy Council of Ceylon, not Singapore. Liyanage 
was probably not even brought to the attention of the Privy Council 
in Ong Ah Chuan, as the former did not concern the adjudication of a 
constitutional clause in pari materia with Singapore’s Article 9(1); on the 
facts, the Privy Council in Liyanage held that the colourable legislation 
passed to secure the convictions of specifi c individuals was inconsistent 
with an implied “separation of powers” principle enshrined within the 
Constitution of Ceylon.23 In the absence of further elaboration, one is 
left guessing as to the motivations behind this judicial sleight of hand, 
but it is certainly an unusual move from a Court that has been very wary 
about adopting overseas norms when the constitutional provisions under 
consideration are not the same.
22 See n 1 above at para 16. 
23 [1967] 1 AC 259 at 291. It is also noteworthy that the Privy Council in Liyanage rejected the 
argument that the Ceylon Parliament was limited by an inability to pass legislation that was 
contrary to fundamental principles of justice as natural justice was too vague and unspecifi ed a 
term. (at 284–285). 
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Customary International Law and MDP
The Court of Appeal next had to confront the alternate Article 9(1) 
argument that Customary International (hereinafter CIL) prohibited 
the imposition of the MDP and since CIL formed part of the laws of 
Singapore under Article 9(1), the MDP was thus unconstitutional. This 
argument too was rejected by the Court of Appeal on two grounds. 
First, the Court of Appeal, following the doctrine of incorporation 
operative in British courts, held that “CIL is incorporated into domestic 
law by the courts as part of the common law in so far as it is not inconsis-
tent with domestic rules which have been enacted by statutes or fi nally 
declared by the courts.”24 Hence, even if such a CIL rule against the MDP 
existed, the CIL formed part of Singapore’s common law and was subor-
dinate to any domestic statute in the event of a confl ict. In other words, 
the Court of Appeal conferred an imported CIL norm with the same 
status as a common law norm, which could be trumped by statute. But 
this was not the only legal option open to the Court. It could, as raised 
by counsel for appellant, state that the expression “law” in Article 9(1) 
included CIL, and where international law is used to interpret a consti-
tutional standard, “it is part of the apex law … and (is) superior in status 
to a statutory rule.”25 After all, the expression “law” under Article 9(1) 
is broadly defi ned in Article 2(1) to include “any custom or usage hav-
ing the force of law in Singapore” and surely that can be interpreted to 
include CIL. Nonetheless, the Court of Appeal demurred, arguing that 
in such an event: 
“the hierarchy of legal rules would be reversed: any rule of CIL that is received 
via the common law would be cloaked with constitutional status and would nul-
lify any statute or any binding judicial precedent which is inconsistent with it.” 
The phrase “custom or usage” in Article 2(1) was thus read narrowly 
to include only local customs and usages that already formed part of 
Singapore’s domestic law.26 Whilst this is a tenable argument, it is one 
that does not give a generous interpretation to the Fundamental Lib-
erties Clauses of the Singapore Constitution, a constitutional interpre-
tive principle exhorted no other than by the Privy Council in Ong Ah 
24 See n 1 above at para 89. 
25 See Thio Li Ann, “Reading Rights Rightly: The UDHR and its Creeping Infl uence on the 
Development of Singapore Public Law”, (2008) Singapore Journal of Legal Studies 264 at 289. 
26 See n 1 above at para 12. 
05-HKLJ-Yap-c04.indd   584 2/3/2011   2:48:03 PM
Vol 40 Part 3 The “Dead” Constitution 585
Chuan,27 a cherished precedent that the Court of Appeal had been so 
adamant about observing. 
The second reason the Court of Appeal gave, for rejecting the argu-
ment that CIL prohibited the imposition of the MDP, was even more 
unfortunate. According to the Chief Justice, 
“Given that the Government (in 1969) deliberated on but consciously 
rejected (the) suggestion of incorporating into the Singapore Constitution 
an express prohibition against inhuman punishment generally, a CIL rule 
prohibiting such punishment – let alone a CIL rule prohibiting the MDP 
specifi cally as an inhuman punishment – cannot now be treated as ‘law’ for 
the purposes of Art 9(1). In other words, given the historical development of 
the Singapore Constitution, it is not possible for us to accept (counsel for the 
appellant’s) submission on the the expression ‘law’ in Art 9(1) without act-
ing as legislators in the guise of interpreters of the Singapore Constitution.”
It is unclear whether the Court of Appeal was aware of the signifi cance 
of the above pronouncement. What the Court of Appeal was, in effect, 
stating was that, since the Government in 1969 had rejected an express 
prohibition against inhuman punishment in general, any CIL norm that 
evolved after 1969 which might prohibit inhuman punishment in general 
or any CIL norm prohibiting a specifi c form of inhuman punishment 
would never be judicially treated as part of Singapore law for the purposes 
of Article 9(1). This novel stance is certainly contrary to the approach 
taken by the Singapore Court of Appeal in the earlier decision in Ngyen 
Tuong Van. In that decision, the Court of Appeal, inter alia, had to decide 
whether the accused’s specifi c mode of execution, ie judicial hanging, 
was contrary to the prohibition under CIL against inhuman punishment 
and was, thus, unconstitutional as CIL norms were implicitly recognised 
as part of Singapore law under Article 9(1). In response, the Singapore 
Court of Appeal stated that, “It is quite widely accepted that the prohibi-
tion against cruel and inhuman treatment or punishment does amount to 
a rule in customary international law” but, on the facts, concluded that 
there was insuffi cient State practice to show that a specifi c CIL norm 
existed prohibiting hanging as a mode of execution and, in any event, 
such a CIL norm could be overridden in Singapore by domestic statute. 
Hence, whilst the Court of Appeal in Nguyen Tuong Van, with regard to 
27 See n 4 above at 670. The Privy Council held that “their Lordships would give to Part IV of the 
Constitution of the Republic of Singapore ‘a generous interpretation’ avoiding what had been 
called ‘the austerity of tabulated legalism’, suitable to give to individuals the full measure of the 
[fundamental liberties ‘referred to’]”.
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Article 9(1), would be amenable to incorporating any specifi c CIL norm 
against inhuman punishment when there is no domestic statute in con-
fl ict with it, the Court of Appeal after Yong would now reject the applica-
bility of all such CIL norms as the Constitutional Framers (arguably) had 
deliberately rejected the inclusion of a constitutional clause prohibiting 
inhuman punishment in general. Whilst the Court of Appeal in Yong 
was probably right on the facts to conclude that a CIL norm had yet 
to develop against the use of the MDP for drug traffi cking offences,28 it 
is another thing altogether to reject outright the notion that a general 
CIL norm prohibiting inhuman punishments forms part of the law of 
Singapore under Article 9(1). After Yong, it also remains an open ques-
tion in Singapore how the Court of Appeal would view a jus cogens norm 
if that confl icts with any pre-existing domestic statute. Certainly, any 
judicial deference to domestic legislation in this regard would be highly 
inappropriate as jus cogens norms embody peremptory fundamental inter-
national values from which no state derogation is allowed.29
Equal Protection and the MDP
Turning fi nally to the appellant’s Article 12(1) challenge, his counsel 
in essence argued that the imposition of the death penalty on offenders 
who traffi cked more than 15g of diamorphine was arbitrary and violated 
the appellant’s right to equal protection under the law. In response, the 
Court of Appeal applied the “rational relation” test to decide whether 
this legislative differentiation, between offenders who traffi cked more 
than 15g of diamorphine and those who traffi cked below that amount, 
passed constitutional muster under the equal protection clause: 
“A differentiating measure ... is valid if (a) the classifi cation is founded on an 
intelligible differentia; and (b) the differentia bears a rational relation to the 
object sought to be achieved by the law in question.”30 
Therefore, according to the Court of Appeal, so long as the legisla-
tive classifi cation had a rational connection with the legislative policy 
28 See n 1 above at para 95. 14 states retain the MDP for drug related offences and 31 states impose 
the MDP for drug related or serious offences like murder. Unfortunately, it would appear that 
there is a lack of “extensive and virtually uniform state practice” [North Sea Continental Shelf 
Cases (1969) ICJ 3 at para 74] to support the argument that CIL prohibits the MDP as an inhu-
man punishment. See also Roger Hood and Carolyn Holye, The Death Penalty: A Worldwide 
Perspective, (OUP: 2008) at 137–138. 
29 See Art 53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, (1969). See also Thio, see n 25 
above at 289–290. 
30 See n 1 above at para 109. 
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in question and the legislative classes furthered the social object of the 
law, the legislative provision in question would be constitutionally valid. 
This touchstone test had i ts origins in American constitutional jurispru-
dence, but was adopted into Singapore law by the Privy Council in Ong 
Ah Chuan.  On the facts, the Court of Appeal in Yong held that that a 
rational nexus was established since there was a reasonable relationship 
between the 15g differentia at issue and the legislature’s desire to impose 
stricter punishment on illicit dealers who traffi c in larger quantities of 
addictive drugs. More signifi cantly, the Court of Appeal, echoing Ong Ah 
Chuan, pronounced that the courts should not question the reasonable-
ness of the legislative policy of choosing 15g as the differentia as this “lies 
within the province of the Legislature, not the Judiciary.”31 
This “rational connection” test is unfortunately not unproblematic. 
First, it can be subjected to legislative manipulation. By framing the pur-
pose of the law narrowly, the legislature would always be able to establish 
a logical nexus between the legislative class and the purpose. For instance, 
if the Singapore Parliament decides to pass a piece of legislation with the 
purpose of “exempting all Ministers’ sons from military service”, the leg-
islative classifi cations (ie, ministers’ sons and non-ministers’ sons) would 
thus invariably bear a rational nexus to the object sought to be achieved. 
As S.M. Thio indicated, “[i]n this way, discriminatory provisions can be 
validly enacted so long as the purpose of the law is formulated in narrow 
terms.”32 
Se condly, “[i]t is always possible to defi ne the legislative purpose of a 
statute in such a way that the statutory classifi cation is rationally related 
to it” because “the reach of the purpose has been derived from the clas-
sifi cations themselves.”33 See n in this light, the defi nition of the legisla-
tive purpose would be a tautology, because the classifi cation would always 
coincide with the object of the law. In every case in which the courts have 
struck down a legislative provision for failing the rational nexus test, it 
would have been equally possible for the courts to defi ne the purpose so 
that the court could have deemed the statute rational.34 In other words, 
the courts can oft en either sustain or reject the rationality of the legislation 
by manipulating the level of abstraction of the legislative object. By way 
of illustration, one can examine the Singapore case of Taw Cheng Kong,35 
wherein the Singaporean accused argued that an extraterritorial penal 
sanction against corruption that applied only to Singapore citizens vio-
lated Article 12(1) of the Singapore Constitution. At trial, the High Court 
31 See n 1 above at para 113. 
32 S.M. Thio, “Equal Protection and Rational Classifi cation”, (1963) Public Law 412 at 428. 
33 Note, “Legislative Purpose, Rationality and Equal Protection”, 82 Yale LJ 123 at 128 (1973).
34 Ibid. at 132.
35 Taw Cheng Kong v Public Prosecutor [1998] 1 SLR 943.
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of Singapore held that the objective of the extraterritorial legislative pro-
vision in question was “to address acts of corruption taking place outside 
Singapore but affecting events within it”.36 Th e High Court’s defi nition of 
the legislative objective thus allowed the judge to observe that the legisla-
tive provision caught a class of people not contemplated by the legisla-
tive objective (ie, Singaporean citizens who lived and worked abroad, and 
who committed corrupt acts abroad that had no impact on Singapore). 
Thus, the High Court concluded that citizenship was “not a useful cri-
teria for determining guilt”37 bec ause the “strength of the nexus between 
the objective and the classifi cation is not suffi ciently strong to justify the 
derogation”38  fro m the constitutional mandate of equality. On appeal, the 
Court of Appeal disagreed, holding that the intent of the Singapore Par-
liament was to increase the effectiveness of corruption prevention while 
observing international comity,39 an d thus a differentiation along the lines 
of citizenship was rationally connected to the furtherance of the legislative 
aim. Therefore, how a court defi nes or formulates the legislative purpose 
invariably allows it to decide the rationality of the statutory classifi cations. 
Finally, by focusing only on the relationship between the purpose 
of the law and the legislative classifi cation, this “rational connection” 
test fails to consider whether the purpose or policy is in itself legiti-
mate and fair. For instance, assume that Parliament passes a statute 
that bars females from seeking public offi ce. If the object of the law 
were framed as such, any gender classifi cations pursuant to this objec-
tive would still bear a rational nexus to the purpose at hand and would 
be sustained as constitutionally valid under this model of equality. For 
the equality jurisprudence in Singapore to truly fl ourish, the Singapore 
Courts must instead recognise that the general equal protection clause 
as enshrined in the Constitution imports a moral precept that limits 
the type of legislative classifi cations that may be legally made.40 Pursu-
ant to this “substantive equality” framework, the judiciary is tasked to 
determine which legislative classifi cations are relevant when the state 
seeks to differentiate between categories of persons and what differ-
ences amongst persons are to be normally ignored in the legislative 
allocation of benefi ts and burdens.41 T he “rational connection” test as 
36 Ibid. at 964.
37 Ibid. at 967. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Public Prosecutor v Taw Cheng Kong (1998) 2 SLR 410 at 436. 
40 The Singapore Constitution only expressly prohibits any state “discrimination against citizens 
of Singapore on the ground only of religion, race, descent or place of birth.” [Art 12(2) of the 
Singapore Constitution].
41 See the Supreme Court of Canada’s decisions in Eldridge v British Columbia [1997] 3 SCR 624 
and Vriend v Alberta [1998] 1 SCR 493.
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applicable in Singapore now is unfortunately not a tool for testing the 
constitutional validit y of a statute, but merely a method for justifying 
its legality.
Conclusion 
Notwithstanding the fl awed arguments the Court of Appeal advanced 
in support of its decision to uphold the constitutionality of the MDP for 
drug traffi cking in Singapore, one may however be sympathetic to the 
judges for reaching the result they did, in view of the political realities 
within Singapore’s constitutional system. 
After all, the incumbent government, the People’s Action Party con-
trols 82 out of 84 of the elected seats in Parliament and it can and will 
certainly reverse the Court’s decision with a constitutional amendment 
if the Court of Appeal had invalidated the MDP legislation.42 The Gov-
ernment had swiftly sought a constitutional amendment when the Court 
of Appeal had ruled against them in 1989, for the fi rst and last time, 
on constitutional grounds. In that seminal decision of Chng Suan Tze v 
Minister of Home Affairs,43 the Court of Appeal, after surveying a litany 
of Commonwealth precedents, quashed a preventive detention order 
issued under the Internal Security Act (ISA) against an alleged Marxist 
conspirator and concluded that the Ministerial discretion to detain per-
sonnel under the ISA would be subject to an “objective” test of review 
by the courts as constitutionally required under Articles 9 and 12 of the 
Singapore Constitution.44 This decision proved to be suffi ciently dis-
quieting to the Executive and the Government quickly overturned this 
decision via a series of constitutional and statutory amendments within a 
month of the judgment, and henceforth restricted judicial review in ISA 
cases to only narrow procedural grounds.45 
In light of the political realities in Singapore, where the ruling party 
jealously guards its prerogative to determine the constitutionality of the 
42 Under Art 5(2) of the Singapore Constitution, constitutional amendments to the Fundamental 
Liberties Clauses can be passed by a two-thirds majority of all the elected Members of Parliament. 
43 (1988) 1 MLJ 133.
44 For a fuller discussion of this case, see Li-ann Thio, “Beyond the ‘Four Walls’ in an age of Trans-
national Judicial Conversations: Civil liberties, Rights Theories, and Constitutional Adjudica-
tion in Malaysia and Singapore” (2006) 19 Columbia Journal of Asian Law 429. 
45 Art 149 of the Singapore Constitution was amended and now provides that any law passed 
against subversion is valid notwithstanding that it is inconsistent with Art 9, 11, 12, 13 or 14 of 
the Constitution. Section 8B of the Internal Security Act, an ouster clause was added, and now 
provides that “there shall be no judicial review in any court of any act done or decision made by 
the President or the Minister under the provisions of this Act save in regard to any question relat-
ing to compliance with any procedural requirement of this Act governing such act or decision.” 
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penal sanctions it imposes, any judicial attempt to invalidate such leg-
islations would be a mere Pyrrhic victory for the courts, as this would 
only lead to a governmental reversal of the Court’s decision. If the Court 
of Appeal had invalidated the MDP legislation, this perceived act of 
judicial immodesty would only trigger a constitutional amendment that 
would not only re-instate the MDP but also permanently oust future judi-
cial review over its legality. 
Certainly, whilst the Court of Appeal might have been prudent to 
avoid a turf war with the Executive which it could not win, the judi-
ciary had unfortunately ceded more ground than it needed to. After 
all, the Court of Appeal could have accepted that Article 9(1) implic-
itly prohibited the imposition of inhuman punishments in general but 
decided that on the facts, the MDP was not one such practice. In the 
same vein, the judges could have recognised that CIL formed part of 
the laws of Singapore for the purposes of Article 9(1) but, on the facts, 
recognise that a CIL norm had yet to develop against the use of the 
MDP. Finally, with regard to the Article 12(1) challenge, the Court of 
Appeal should have jettisoned the highly fl awed “rational connection” 
test in favour of a “substantive equality” framework adopted by the 
Canadian Courts that directly examined the propriety of the legislative 
basis for differentiating between categories of persons. Ergo, the Court 
of Appeal could on the facts have concluded that the 15g differentia 
did not violate the constitutional right to equality as the impugned 
legislative differentiation was not made on “the basis of a personal char-
acteristic that is immutable or changeable only at unacceptable cost to 
personal identity”. 46 
Nevertheless, credit must be given to the Court of Appeal for making 
some efforts to distance itself from the rhetoric of the former Singapore 
Chief Justice, Yong Pung How, who had expressed his judicial unconcern 
with international law47 and preference for interpreting the Singapore 
Constitution “within its four walls and not in the light of analogies drawn 
from other countries, such as Great Britain, the United States of America 
or Australia”.48 This new panel of Singapore Court of Appeal judges is 
certainly more sophisticated and nuanced in its engagement with foreign 
constitutional norms, but by upholding originalism as its preferred mode 
of constitutional interpretation, the learned judges had unfortunately 
46 See Corbiere v Canada (Minister of Indian and Northern Affairs [1999] 2 SCR 203, at para 13. 
47 Chief Justice Yong Pung How was so quoted by the local daily, Straits Times on 1 Oct 2003: I am 
not concerned with international law. I am a poor humble servant of the law in Singapore. 
48 Colin Chan v Public Prosecutor (1994) 3 SLR 662 at 681. 
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forgotten the central interpretive principle taught by the Privy Council 
in Ong Ah Chuan: 
“The way to interpret a constitution on the Westminster model is to treat it 
not as it were an Act of Parliament but ‘as sui generis, calling for principles of 
interpretation of its own, suitable to its character ... without necessary accep-
tance of all the presumptions that are relevant to legislation of private law.’”49 
49 See n 4 above at 669–670. 
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